Petrus Dadi Ratu by Anderson, Benedict R. O'G.
Pe t r u s  D a d i  Ra t u *
Benedict R. O'G. Anderson
In the early 1930s, Bung Kamo was hauled before a Dutch colonial court on a 
variety of charges of "subversion." He was perfectly aware that the whole legal 
process was prearranged by the authorities, and he was in court merely to receive a 
heavy sentence. Accordingly, rather than wasting his time on defending himself against 
the charges, he decided to go on the attack by laying bare all aspects of the racist 
colonial system. Known by its title "Indonesia Accuses!," his defense plea has since 
become a key historical document for the future of the Indonesian people he loved so 
well.
Roughly forty-five years later, Col. Abdul Latief was brought before a special 
military court—after thirteen years in solitary confinement—also on a variety of 
charges of subversion. Since he too was perfectly aware that the whole process was 
prearranged by the authorities, he followed in Bung Kamo's footsteps by turning his 
defense plea into a biting attack on the New Order, and especially on the cruelty, 
cunning, and despotism of its creator. It is a great pity that this historic document has 
had to wait twenty-two years to become available to the Indonesian people he loves so 
well.
But who is, and was, Abdul Latief, who in his youth was called Gus Dul? While 
still a young boy (aged fifteen), he was conscripted by the Dutch for basic military 
training in the face of an impending mass assault by the forces of Imperial Japan. 
However, the colonial authorities quickly surrendered, and Gus Dul was briefly 
imprisoned by the occupying Japanese.
Subsequently, he joined the Seinendan (a paramilitary youth organization) and the 
Peta (Fatherland Defense Force, an auxiliary military apparatus set up by the Japanese 
on Java) in East Java. After the Revolution broke out (1945), he served continuously on 
the front lines, at first along the perimeter of Surabaya, and subsequently in Central
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Java. Towards the end, he played a key role in the famous "General Assault of March 
1, 1949" on Jogjakarta, the Dutch-occupied revolutionary capital: directly under the 
command of Lt. Col. Suharto. After the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, 
Latief led combat units against various rebel forces: the groups of Andi Azis and 
Kahar Muzakar in South Sulawesi; the separatist Republic of the South Moluccas; the 
radical Islamic Battalion 426 in Central Java; the Darul Islam in West Java; and finally 
the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (CIA-financed and armed 
rebellion of 1957-58) in West Sumatra. He was a member of the second graduating 
class of the Staff and Command College (Suharto was a member of the first class). 
Finally, during the Confrontation with Malaysia, he was assigned the important post 
of commander of Brigade 1 in Jakarta, directly under the capital's territorial 
commander, General Umar Wirahadikusumah. In this capacity he played an 
important, but not central, role in the September 30th Movement of 1965. From this 
sketch it is clear that Gus Dul was and is a true-blue combat soldier, with a 
psychological formation typical of the nationalist freedom fighters of the Independence 
Revolution and an absolute loyalty to its Great Leader.
His culture? The many references in his defense speech both to the Koran and to 
the New Testament indicate a characteristic Javanese syncretism. Standard Marxist 
phraseology is almost wholly absent.
And his accusations? The first is that Suharto, then the commander of the Army's 
Strategic Reserve (Kostrad), was fully briefed beforehand, by Latief himself, on the 
Council of Generals' plotting of Sukarno's overthrow and on the September 30th 
Movement's plans for preventive action. (General Umar too was informed through the 
hierarchies of the Jakarta Garrison and the Jakarta Military Police.) This means that 
Suharto deliberately allowed the September 30th Movement to start its operations and 
did not report on it to his superiors, General Nasution and General Yani (Nasution 
was Defense Minister and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Yani the Army Chief of 
Staff. Yani was killed on October 1, and Nasution barely escaped with his life). By the 
same token, Suharto was perfectly positioned to take action against the September 30th 
Movement, once his rivals at the top of the military command structure had been 
eliminated. MachiavelH would have applauded.
We know that Suharto gave two contradictory public accounts of his meeting with 
Latief late in the night of September 30th at the Army Hospital. Neither one is 
plausible. To the American journalist Arnold Brackman, Suharto said that Latief had 
come to the hospital to "check" on him (Suharto's baby son Tommy was being treated 
for minor bums from scalding soup). But "checking" on him for what? Suharto did not 
say. To Der Siegel, Suharto later confided that Latief had come to kill him, but lost his 
nerve because there were too many people around (as if Gus Dul only then realized 
that hospitals are very busy places!). The degree of Suharto's commitment to truth can 
be gauged from the following facts: By October 4,1965, a team of forensic doctors had 
given him directly their detailed autopsies on the bodies of the murdered generals. The 
autopsies showed that all the victims had been gunned down by military weapons. But 
two days later, a campaign in the mass media (by then fully under Kostrad control) 
was initiated to the effect that the generals' eyes had been gouged out and their 
genitals cut off by members of Gerwani (the Communist Party's women's affiliate).
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These icy lies were planned to create an anticommunist hysteria in all strata of 
Indonesian society.
Other facts strengthen Latief's accusation. Almost all the key military participants 
in the September 30th Movement were, either currently or previously, close subordinates 
of Suharto: Lt. Col. Untung, Col. Latief, and Brig. Gen. Supardjo in Jakarta, and Col. 
Suherman, Major Usman, and their associates at the Diponegoro Division's HQ in 
Semarang. When Untung got married in 1963, Suharto made a special trip to a small 
Central Javanese village to attend the ceremony. When Suharto's son Sigit was 
circumcised, Latief was invited to attend, and when Latief's son's turn came, the 
Suharto family were honored guests. It is quite plain that these officers, who were not 
bom yesterday, fully believed that Suharto was with them in their endeavor to rescue 
Sukarno from the conspiracy of the Council of Generals. Such trust is incomprehensible 
unless Suharto, directly or indirectly, gave his "OK" to their plans. It is therefore not at 
all surprising that Latief's answer to my question, "How did you feel on the evening of 
October 1?" (Suharto had full control of the capital by late afternoon) was "I felt I had 
been betrayed."
Furthermore, Latief's account explains clearly one of the many mysteries 
surrounding the September 30th Movement: why were the two generals who directly 
commanded all the troops in Jakarta, except for the Presidential Guard—namely 
Kostrad Commander Suharto and Jakarta Military Territory Commander Umar—not 
"taken care of" by the September 30th Movement if its members really intended a coup 
to overthrow the government, as the Military Prosecutor charged? The reason is that 
the two men were regarded as friends!
A further point is that we now know that, months before October 1, Ali Murtopo 
(then Kostrad's intelligence chief) was pursuing a foreign policy kept secret from both 
Sukarno and Yani. Exploiting the contacts of former rebels (in the 1957-58 civil war, 
when these people were closely tied to the CIA as well as the Special Branch in 
Singapore and then colonial Malaya), clandestine connections were made with the 
leaderships of two then enemy countries, Malaysia and Singapore, as well as with 
America. (At that time Benny Murdani was furthering these connections from Bangkok, 
where he was disguised as an employee in the local Garuda office.) Hence it looks as if 
Latief is right when he states that Suharto was two-faced, or, perhaps better put, two- 
fisted. In one fist he held Latief-Untung-Supardjo, and in the other Murtopo-Yoga 
Sugama (a Japanese-trained high-ranking intelligence officer)-Murdani.
The second accusation reverses the charges of the Military Prosecutor that the 
September 30th Movement intended to overthrow the government and that the Council 
of Generals was a pack of lies. Latief's conclusion is that it was precisely Suharto who 
planned and executed the overthrow of Sukarno; and that a Council of Generals did 
exist—composed not of Nasution, Yani et al., but rather of Suharto and his trusted 
generals, who went on to create a dictatorship based on the Army which lasted for 
decades thereafter.
Once again, the facts are on Latief's side. General Pranoto Reksosamudro, 
appointed by President/Commander-in-Chief Sukarno to be acting Army Chief of 
Staff after Yani's murder, found his appointment rejected by Suharto, and his person 
soon put under detention. Aidit, Lukman, and Nyoto (the three top Politbureau
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leaders), then holding ministerial status in Sukarno's government, were murdered out 
of hand. And although President Sukarno did his utmost to prevent it, Suharto and his 
associates planned and carried out vast massacres in the months of October, 
November, and December 1965. As Latief himself underlines, in March 1966 a "silent 
coup" took place: military units surrounded the building where a plenary cabinet 
meeting was taking place, and hours later the President was forced, more or less at 
gunpoint, to sign the super-samar Supersemar. Suharto immediately "demissioned" 
Sukarno's cabinet and arrested fifteen ministers. Latief's simple verdict is that it was 
not the September 30th Movement which was guilty of grave and planned 
insubordination against the President, ending in his overthrow, but rather the man 
whom young wags have been calling GPK: not Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan, or Order- 
Disturbing Elements, but Gali Pelarian Kemusu—gangster escaped from Kemusu 
(Suharto's birthplace).
Latief's third accusation is broader than the others and just as grave. He accuses 
the New Order authorities of extraordinary, and wholly extra-legal, cruelty.
That The Accuser is today still alive, with his wits intact, and his heart full of fire, 
shows him to be a man of almost miraculous fortitude. During his arrest on October 
11, 1965, many key nerves in his right thigh were severed by a bayonet, while his left 
knee was completely shattered by bullets (in fact, he put up no resistance). In the 
Military Hospital his entire body was put into a gypsum cast, so that he could only 
move his head. Yet in this condition, he was still interrogated before being thrust into a 
tiny, dank, and filthy isolation cell—where he remained for the following thirteen 
years. His wounds became gangrenous and emitted the foul smell of carrion. When on 
one occasion the cast was removed for inspection, hundreds of maggots came crawling 
out. At the sight, one of the jailers had to run outside to vomit. For two and a half 
years—just imagine!—Latief lay there in his cast before being operated on. He was also 
forcibly given an injection of penicillin, though he told his guards he was violently 
allergic to it—with the result that he fainted and almost died. Over the years he 
suffered from hemorrhoids, a hernia, kidney stones, and calcification of the spine. The 
treatment received by other prisoners, especially the many military men among them, 
was not very different, and their food was scarce and often rotting. It is no surprise, 
therefore, that many died in the Salemba Prison, many became paralytics after torture, 
and still others went mad. In the face of such sadism, perhaps even the Kempeitai 
would have blanched. And this was merely Salemba—one among the countless prisons 
in Jakarta and throughout the archipelago, where hundreds of thousands of human 
beings were held for years without trial. Who was responsible for the construction of 
this tropical Gulag?
History textbooks for Indonesia's schoolchildren speak of a colonial monster 
named Captain "Turk" Westerling. They usually give the number of his victims in 
South Sulawesi (in 1946) as forty thousand. It is certain that many more were 
wounded, many houses were burned down, much property looted, and, here and there, 
women raped. The defense speech of Gus Dul asks the reader to reflect on an ice-cold 
"native" monster, whose sadism far outstripped that of the infamous Captain. In the 
massacres of 1965-66, a minimum of 600,000 were murdered. (If the reported 
deathbed confession of General Sarwo Edhie to the paranormal psychic Mas Permadi 
is true, the number may have reached over two million.) Between 1977 and 1979, at
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least 200,000 human beings in East Timor died before their time, either killed directly 
or condemned to planned death through systematic starvation and its accompanying 
diseases. Amnesty International reckons that seven thousand people were 
extrajudicially assassinated in the Petrus Affair of 1983. (A grim joke of the time 
called the soldiers-in-mufti death-squads Petrus—as in St. Peter—an acronym derived 
from Penembak Misterius, Mysterious Killers.) To these victims, we must add those in 
Aceh, Irian, Lampung, Tanjung Priok, and elsewhere. At the most conservative 
estimate: 800,000 lives, or twenty times the "score" of Westerling. And all these 
victims, at the time their deaths, were regarded officially as fellow-nationals, bangsa 
dhezve, of the monster.
Latief speaks of other portions of the national tragedy which are also food for 
thought. For example, the hundreds of thousands of people who spent years in prison 
without clear charges against them, and without any due process of law, besides 
suffering, on a routine basis, excruciating torture. To say nothing of uncountable losses 
of property to theft and looting, casual, everyday rapes, and social ostracism for 
years, not only for former prisoners themselves, but for their wives and widows, 
children, and kinfolk in the widest sense.
Latief's J'accuse was written twenty-two years ago, and many things have 
happened in his country in the meantime. But it is only now perhaps that it can 
become of the greatest importance if it serves to prick the conscience of the Indonesian 
people, especially the young. To make a big fuss about the corruption of Suharto and 
his family—as though his criminality were of the same gravity as Eddy Tansil's—is like 
making a big fuss about Idi Amin's mistresses, Slobodan Milosevic's peculations, or 
Adolf Hitler's kitschy taste in art. That Jakarta's middle class, and a substantial part 
of its intelligentsia, still busy themselves with the cash stolen by "Father Harto" 
(perhaps in their dreams they think of it as duit kite ["our cash"]) shows very clearly 
that they are still unprepared to face the totality of Indonesia's modem history. This 
attitude, which is that of the ostrich that plunges its head in the desert sands, is very 
dangerous. A wise man once said: Those who ignore the past are condemned to repeat 
it. Terrifying, no?
Important as it is, Latief's defense, composed under exceptional conditions, cannot 
lift the veil which still shrouds many aspects of the September 30th Movement and its 
aftermath. Among so many questions, one could raise at least these: Why was Latief 
himself not executed, when Untung, Supardjo, Air Force Major Suyono, and others had 
their death sentences carried out? Why were Yani and the other generals killed at all, 
when the original plan was to bring them, as a group, face to face with Sukarno? Why 
did First Lieutenant Dul Arief of the Presidential Guard, who actually led the attacks 
on the generals' homes, subsequently vanish without a trace? How and why did all of 
Central Java fall into the hands of supporters of the September 30th Movement for a 
day and a half, while nothing similar occurred in any other province? Why did Col. 
Suherman, Major Usman, and their associates in Semarang also disappear without a 
trace? Who really was Syam alias Kamaruzzaman (allegedly the head of the 
Communist Party's secret Special Bureau for military affairs, and planner of the 
Movement's activities)—former official of the Recomba of the Federal State of 
Pasundan (in 1948-49, the Dutch set up a set of puppet regimes in various provinces 
they controlled to offset the power and prestige of the independent Republic; Recomba
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was the name of this type of regime in Java, and Pasundan is the old name for 
Sundanese-speaking West Java), former member of the (anti-Communist) Indonesian 
Socialist Party, former intelligence operative for the Jakarta Military District at the time 
of the huge smuggling racket run by General Nasution and General Ibnu Sutowo out of 
Tanjung Priok, as well as former close friend of D. N. Aidit? Was he an army spy in 
the ranks of the communists? Or a communist spy inside the military? Or a spy for a 
third party? Or all three simultaneously? Was he really executed, or does he live 
comfortably abroad with a new name and a fat wallet?
Latief also cannot give us answers to questions about key aspects of the activities 
of the September 30th Movement, above all its political stupidities. Lt. Col. Untung's 
radio announcement that starting from October 1 the highest military rank would be the 
one he himself held automatically made enemies of all the generals and colonels in 
Indonesia, many of whom held command of important combat units. Crazy, surely? 
Why was the announced list of the members of the so-called Revolutionary Council so 
confused and implausible? (The Movement proclaimed this Council as the temporary 
ruling authority in Indonesia, but its membership included right-wing generals, second- 
tier left-wingers, and various notoriously opportunist politicians while omitting almost 
all figures with national reputations and large organizations behind them.) Why did 
the Movement not announce that it was acting on the orders of President Sukarno 
(even if this was untrue), but instead "demissioned" Sukarno's own cabinet? Why did 
it not appeal to the masses to crowd into the streets to help safeguard the nation's 
head? It passes belief that such experienced and intelligent leaders as Aidit, Nyoto, 
and Sudisman (the PKI's secretary-general) would have made such a string of political 
blunders. Hence the suspicion naturally arises that this string was deliberately 
arranged to ensure the Movement's failure. Announcements of the kind mentioned 
above merely confused the public, paralyzed the masses, and provided easy pretexts 
for smashing the September 30th Movement itself. In this event, who really set up these 
bizarre announcements and arranged for their broadcast over national radio?
Most of the main actors in, and key witnesses to, the crisis of 1965 have either died 
or been killed. And those who are still alive have kept their lips tightly sealed, for 
various motives: for example, Umar Wirahadikusumah, Omar Dhani (Air Force chief 
in 1965, sentenced to death, had his sentence reduced to life imprisonment, and was 
recently released), Sudharmono (for decades a close aide to Suharto), Rewang (former 
candidate member of the Communist Party's Politbureau), M. Panggabean (a top 
general in Suharto's clique and his successor as commander of Kostrad), Murdani, Mrs. 
Hartini, Mursyid (Sukamoist general heading military operations for the Army Staff in 
1965, subsequently arrested), Yoga Sugama, Andi Yusuf, and Kemal Idris (these last 
two generals played central roles in the overthrow of Sukarno). Now that thirty-five 
years have passed since 1965, would it not be a good thing—for the future of the 
Indonesian nation, of course—if these people were required to provide the most 
detailed accounts of what they did and witnessed—at least before they go to meet 
their Maker?
According to an old popular saying, the mills of God grind slowly but very fine. 
The meaning of this adage is that in the end the rice of Truth will be separated from the 
chaff of confusion and lies. In every part of the world, one day or another, long-held 
classified documents, memoirs in manuscripts locked away in cabinets, and diaries
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gathering dust in the attics of grandchildren will be brought to His mill, and their 
contents will become known to later generations.
With this book of his, "shut away" over twenty-two years of extraordinary 
suffering, Abdul Latief, with his astonishing fortitude, has provided an impressive 
exemplification of the old saying. Who knows, some day his Accusations may provide 
valuable material for the script of that play in the repertoire of the National History 
Shadow-Theater which is entitled—well, what else could it be?—Petrus Dadi Ratu, or 
Petrus Becomes King.
FINIS

